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LAURENCE ANTHONY GO

DOCTORAL STUDIES

2014 – Present • **PHD IN APPLIED ECONOMICS**
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Thesis Title: "Essays in Development Economics"
Expected Completion Date: May 2020

PROF. SANTOSH ANAGOL
CO-CHAIR / PRIMARY ADVISOR
Business Economics & Public Policy
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PROF. MAISY WONG
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Real Estate
Wharton School
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PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES

2016 • **MS IN APPLIED ECONOMICS**
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

2014 • **MSC IN ECONOMETRICS AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS**
London School of Economics and Political Science

2011 • **BS IN BUSINESS ECONOMICS**
University of the Philippines

RESEARCH & TEACHING

PRIMARY: *Development Economics, Political Economy*
SECONDARY: *Labor Economics, Organizational Economics*

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Fall 2016 • **MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS (BEPP 250/950)**
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
TA for Professor Gilles Duranton

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

2015 - 2018 • **RESEARCH ASSISTANT FOR PROFESSOR SHING-YI WANG**
2016 • **CONSULTANT, WORLD BANK, WASHINGTON D.C.**
2015 • **RESEARCH ASSISTANT FOR PROFESSOR MAISY WONG**

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

2017 • **TRANS-ATLANTIC DOCTORAL CONFERENCE, LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL**
2016 • **WHARTON-INSEAD DOCTORAL CONSORTIUM, INSEAD, SINGAPORE**

GRANTS & FELLOWSHIPS

2018 • INSTITUTE FOR HUMANE STUDIES HUMANE STUDIES FELLOWSHIP
2018 • INSTITUTE FOR HUMANE STUDIES HAYEK FUND SCHOLARSHIP
2017 • RODNEY L. WHITE CENTER FOR FINANCIAL RESEARCH GRANT
2017 • INSTITUTE FOR HUMANE STUDIES PHD SCHOLARSHIP
2017 • WHARTON DOCTORAL TRAVEL GRANT
2016 • GAPSA TRAVEL GRANT
2015, 2017 - 18 • MACK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION MANAGEMENT FELLOWSHIP
2015 • WHARTON SOCIAL IMPACT INITIATIVE RESEARCH GRANT
2014 - 2019 • WHARTON DOCTORAL EDUCATION FELLOWSHIP

ACADEMIC SERVICE

Refereed for: Journal of Public Economics

RESEARCH PAPERS

JOB MARKET PAPER • *"Family Comes First: Political Dynasties, Rank Effect and Political Succession", with Dean Dulay*

What explains the persistence of political dynasties over time? We argue that dynasties remain in power through strategic succession of family members. We test this empirically by exploiting a setting where rank effects are observed, i.e. where candidates who barely rank higher in elections are significantly more likely to run for higher office. Using a regression discontinuity design on close elections in the Philippines, we establish the first place effect: first placers are 5-9% more likely to seek election to higher office than comparable second placers. We then document a novel phenomenon called the family first effect: first place effects are overturned when family linkages between politicians exist. Succession norms, where dynasties assign their family members to different positions of power, across different periods in time, are consistent with these results. Party alignment, voter coordination and information transmission are unlikely to explain our findings.

WORKING PAPER • *"When Running for Office Runs in the Family: Political Dynasties, Preferences and Local Government Spending in the Philippines", with Dean Dulay*

Political dynasties exist in practically every variant of democracy. Yet, the literature has not theorized about how particular forms and functions of political dynasties benefit their members. We argue that horizontal dynasties—multiple members from a family holding political office concurrently—leads to higher levels of local government spending. Horizontal dynasties increase local government spending by replacing potential political opponents who may oppose spending with members of the family. Members from the same family have aligned preferences, and these preferences reduce conflict and increase coordination across offices, allowing politicians to pursue their political goals. We test this argument's implications in the Philippine context. Employing a regression discontinuity design on a sample of mayors, we show that (i) horizontally dynastic mayors have higher levels of local government spending and (ii) increasing local government spending is driven by preference alignment, which leads to less conflict and greater coordination between politicians.

RESEARCH PAPERS IN PROGRESS

MIGRATION AND VOTING NETWORKS:
Evidence from Filipino Migrants in the UAE (with Shing-Yi Wang)

MINIMUM WAGE DETERMINATION:
Evidence from Regional Wage Boards in the Philippines

ECONOMIC NATIONALISM, FIRM GROWTH AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT:
Evidence from Naturalization Laws

OTHERS

SOFTWARE: *Stata, R, Matlab, LaTeX, ArcGIS*
PERSONAL INFORMATION: *February 1, 1989; Male; Filipino*